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The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Past
Failures, Present Solutions
Abstract
North Korea has recently announced that it has developed nuclear weapons and 
has pulled out of the six-party talks.  These events do not emerge out of a vacuum, and 
this article lends perspective based on an interdisciplinary lens that seeks to grapple with 
the complexities and provide constructive approaches based on this well-researched 
understanding.  This article analyzes political, military, historical, legal and other angles 
of this international crisis.
Past dealings with North Korea have been unfruitful because other nations do not 
recognize the ties between North Korean acts and its ideology and objectives. For a 
satisfactory resolution to the current crisis, South Korea and the U.S. must maintain 
sufficient deterrence, focus on multi-lateral and international avenues, and increase the 
negative and later positive incentives for North Korean compliance with its international 
obligations. 
From an international legal and international organizations perspective, the 
multilateral talks can be bolstered by inclusion of the United Nations Secretary General 
as a proactive mediator. It can call for, if necessary and after the failure of other means, 
UN Security Council action and the reinstitution of the IAEA to do its duly constituted 
work of preventing proliferation.  If these approaches succeed, the peninsula, region and 
world will become better places as a result.  
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Introduction
Nuclear physicists Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassman turned the hinges of history 
through the small but stupendous act of splitting a uranium atom.1  The devastating 
power of an atomic bomb itself came about through the efforts of American nuclear 
scientists through the Manhattan Project.2 A particular isotope of uranium, U235, 
accounts for nuclear possibilities.3  This atom, when hit by a neutron, emits one or more 
neutrons along with energy as it breaks apart into two pieces: this process is known as 
fission.4  A successive chain reaction can take place under the proper parameters. 5 When 
one controls this chain reaction so that the rate of fission remains constant, nuclear 
energy results.6
Many nations, including North Korea, make use of nuclear fission to generate 
electricity.7  In 1993, contrary to the terms of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty which 
it had signed, North Korea refused to allow inspections of one of its nuclear facilities, 
which the U.S., Japan, and South Korea suspected of processing nuclear materials for 
weapons.8 For the next eighteen months, North Korea played a game of nuclear 
brinkmanship—keeping inspectors at arms’ length, threatening to withdraw totally from 
the NPT, agreeing to and withdrawing from talks, and increasing the vehemence of its 
propaganda to threaten war in the face of proposed sanctions—to try to secure more 
1 H. Athanasopulos, NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (McFarland & Company 2000).
2 Id.
3 See Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Law and the H-Bomb: Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime To 
Impede Advanced Proliferation, 28 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 71, 77 (Winter 1995).
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 77-78.
7 B. K. GILLS, KOREA VERSUS KOREA: A CASE OF CONTESTED LEGITIMACY, 235-36 (1996).
8 Id. at 236.
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economic aid and political leverage against the U.S.9 B. K. Gills writes that the nuclear 
crisis was on a “trajectory towards war” until Jimmy Carter, of his own accord, brokered 
a deal that removed the sanction threat if North Korea agreed to inspections, thus averting 
the crisis.10
Ten years later, however, not only is North Korea violating its pledge not to 
develop nuclear weapons, it has brazenly declared to the world that it already possesses 
such weapons.11 Analysts attribute North Korea’s desire for weapons to several factors, 
such as deterrence against a perceived Western threat,12 a bargaining chip to gain political 
and economic advantages,13 or as a natural extension of the national ideology.14 No 
matter the reason, atomic weapons in the hands of a nation with a stated goal to reunite 
the Korean Peninsula by force, a nation that has violated all of its major international 
agreements, a nation with missile systems capable of reaching South Korea, Japan, and 
possibly even the United States, are greatly opposed by these nations.15
This situation is worsened by North Korea’s refusal to engage in multi-nation 
talks that include South Korea, the U.S. and Japan, plus North Korea's own traditional 
9 Id. at 236-40.
10 Id. at 240-43; William M. Drennan, Nuclear Weapons and North Korea: Who’s Coercing Whom?, in
THE UNITED STATES AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 159 (Robert J. Art & Patrick M. Cronin, eds., 2003).
11 See, e.g., Michael Duffy, What Does North Korea Want? TIME (Feb. 13, 2005), available at
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,1027498,00.html; Timeline: N. Korea Nuclear 
Dispute, CNN.COM (Feb. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/02/10/nkorea.timeline/; North Korea Chronology, available at
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_06/nkoreachron_june03.asp (June 2003).
12 See, e.g., Daniel A. Pinkston et al., Special Report on the North Korean Nuclear Weapons Statement, 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, at
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/050211.htm (Feb. 11, 2005).
13 North Korea’s Threat, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Feb. 12, 2005), at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A17611-2005Feb11?language=printer.
14 See Sung-Yoon Lee, Global Pressure Point: Nuclear Diplomacy vis-à-vis the DPRK: A Dead-End Street, 
27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 151 (Summer/Fall, 2003).
15 See, e.g., Pinkston et al., supra note 12.
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allies China and Russia,16 which many analysts view as the best prospect for lasting 
solutions.17 Instead, North Korea wants to bypass South Korea, the nation with the most 
at stake, and deal with the United States directly.18 Although the U.S. currently opposes 
bilateral talks, an effective strategy to address the complexities of the current crisis has 
yet to emerge.19
For the past fifty years, North Korea has lied, broken its word, and pushed 
tensions to the brink of war, so that negotiations with this country have routinely been 
unproductive, if not outright failures. With nuclear weapons in the equation, though, the 
need for effective solutions has never been higher. At the same time, one scholar has 
called nuclear diplomacy with North Korea “a dead-end street.”20 With these stakes as the 
background, this paper presents the history of North Korean relations with other 
countries, explores current actions and international responses, and offers solutions, with 
a focus on the application of international legal instruments and organizations.
Background: Korea Divided and North Korea as Rogue State
History of the Division
Korean Conflict
After finding itself no longer under the ignominy of the Japanese colonial period 
(1905-end of WWII),21 Korea moved into a different sort of problem.  The Soviet Union, 
16 Id.
17 E.g., Lee, supra note 14. 
18 See North Korea’s Threat, supra note 13.
19 Id. 
20 Lee, supra note 17, at 152.
21 See Max Hastings, THE KOREAN WAR 25 (1987); see also Michael Hickey, The Korean War: An 
Overview, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/coldwar/korea_hickey_01.shtml; American 
Military History, Army Historical Series, Office of The Chief Military History, United States Army ch. 25, 
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after a period of relative inaction, decided actively to pursue military efforts at the end of 
WWII in order to strengthen its hand during post-war settlements.22  They poured south 
into Manchuria.23  The resulting U.S.-Soviet agreement, contrary to the will of the 
Korean people, split this small peninsula into the U.S.-aligned South Korea and the 
Soviet-aligned North Korea, with the Soviets agreeing to push no further south than the 
38th parallel.24
Border skirmishes ensued over the next few years until, on the early morning of 
June 25th, 1950, North Korean forces embarked on a full-scale war by launching out over 
the 38th parallel.25  Premier Kim Il Sung had eight full divisions (135,000 troops) at his 
disposal.  Many of these soldiers fought previously in World War II.26  By contrast, South 
Korea counted only 95,000 generally less-seasoned soldiers.27
The North Korean divisions drove deep into South Korea, overmatching the 
smaller South Korean forces, pushed down to the Pusan Perimeter, a relatively small 
swath of land at the southernmost tip of the peninsula.28  The North Korean troops made 
full use of the advantage of surprise and initiative.29
available at http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/amh/AMH-25.htm; Henry Chung, KOREA AND THE 
UNITED STATES THROUGH WAR AND PEACE 43-85 (2000).
22 See, e.g., Robert J. Myers, KOREA IN THE CROSS CURRENTS: A CENTURY OF STRUGGLE AND THE CRISIS 
OF REUNIFICATION 77-95 (2001); Chung, supra note 21, at 97-108.
23 Chung, supra note 21, at 97; Myers, supra note 22, at 78.
24 Chung, supra note 21, at 109-24; Myers, supra note 22, at 78-79; M.P. Srivastava, THE KOREAN 
CONFLICT: SEARCH FOR UNIFICATION 54 (1982). 
25 Chung, supra note 21 at 155; Bruce Cumings, KOREA’S PLACE IN THE SUN 260-63 (1997).
26 American Military History, supra note 21.
27 Id. at 25.
28 Chung, supra note 21, at 169.
29 But see Cumings, supra note 25, at 261-63 (South Korean intelligence expected an attack on the Ongjin 
peninsula, which was repulsed – the surprise may have been that the attack continued and was more 
widespread than the Ongjin peninsula).
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As the North steamrolled the South, the U.S. called upon the UN Security Council 
to take action against North Korean aggression.30  The Security Council, with the support 
of fifty-three U.N. member states, called upon its members to send military assistance: 
twenty-nine member states made specific offers to help.31  As it turned out, twenty 
countries came to the aid of South Korea.  General Douglas MacArthur stepped forward 
as the United Nations commander of the combined forces.32
MacArthur lead a key counter-initiative known as the Inchon Landing, a tricky 
military maneuver due to the tides.33  By the middle of September, 1950, MacArthur's 
forces not only plowed back to the 38th parallel, they continued on north.34  As the U.N. 
forces proceeded closer to the North Korean-Chinese border, Chinese soldiers poured 
into North Korea, driving the U.N. forces back.35  After two more pushes, one northward 
by the U.N. troops and one southward by the Chinese, the battle lines hardened for two 
more years back where they started—the 38th parallel.36
Armistice Agreement
With a military draw by mid-1951, the two sides negotiated from that point for 
two years, resulting in the Korean Armistice Agreement ("Armistice Agreement"), signed 
on July 27th, 1953.37  The head of the North Korean military and the Commander-in-
Chief of the U.N. Command signed this Armistice Agreement.38
30 Chung, supra note 21, at 159-6; Srivastava, supra note 24, at 17-45. 
31 Hickey, supra note 21, at Introduction.
32 Chung, supra note 21, at 165-66.
33 Id. at 170-77.  MacArthur, aware of the historic significance of the Inchon Landing, actually staged the 
landing twice for the cameras that would capture it for posterity.
34 Cumings, supra note 25, at 276-78.
35 See Hickey, supra note 21, at China’s Intervention; Cumings, supra note 25, at 283-86.
36 See Hickey, supra note 21, at China’s Intervention; Cumings, supra note 25, at 289.
37 Chung, supra note 21, at 300-02.  Note that South Korea had no desire to sign an armistice, and had to be 
persuaded to sign by General MacArthur, largely through repeated assurances that the U.S. was committed 
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While this Agreement calls for a cease-fire, it is not a peace treaty.39  This 
Armistice Agreement established the military line of demarcation, and the demilitarized 
zone (DMZ).40  The Military Armistice Commission oversees this Agreement.41
The Armistice Agreement, intended as a temporary measure by its own terms, 
was supposed to be replaced by a peace treaty through a conference convening within 
three months after the Armistice Agreement.42  While a treaty emerging from the 
conference was supposed to settle the remaining issues such as withdrawal of foreign 
forces from Korea and a new peace for the Land of the Morning Calm, this anticipated 
peace treaty did not come about as planned.  Due to this gap, the two Koreas signed the 
Agreement of Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between 
North and South towards the end of 1991, and the Joint Declaration in 1992.43
North Korea as Rogue State44
History of Hostile Actions
Notwithstanding the Armistice, the U.S. Congressional Research Service has 
documented some 124 provocations by North Korea against the U.S., South Korea, 
to unifying Korea.  Id., at 280-300; THE INSTITUTE OF EAST ASIA STUDIES, FOREIGN POLICY FOR PEACE 
AND UNIFICATION 15-16 (1975).
38 See, e.g., Myers, supra note  at 92-95.  The Armistice Agreement, a purely military document, can be 
found in its entirety at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/korea/kwarmagr072753.html.  There are no 
national signatories to this Agreement.
39 Cecilia Y. Oh, Comment, The Effect of Reunification of North and South Korea on Treaty Status, 16 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 311, 311-12 (Spring, 2002).
40 Id.
41 Armistice Agreement, supra note 38, arts. I(1), II(A)-(B).
42 See Id. Art. IV; Chung, supra note 21, at 300.
43 See http://www.korea.net/issue/sn/summit/summit 012106.asp, which contains the Agreement on 
Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation Between North and South, effective from 
Feb. 19, 1992.  See also Joint Declaration by South and North Korea of the Denuclearization of the Korean 
Peninsula, Jan. 20, 1992, S. Korea-N. Korea, IAEA Doc. GOV/INF/660, Attachment (1992), 33 I.L.M. 569 
(1994) ("Joint Declaration"). 
44 "Rogue state" is the actual designation that the Clinton administration placed on the North Korean 
regime.
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and/or Japan from June 1950 to March 2003.45  They have ranged from multiple 
assassination attempts on South Korean Presidents,46 to the infiltration of thousands of 
armed agents involved in kidnapping and terrorism,47 the mid-air bombing of a South 
Korean Boeing 707 passenger plane in 198748 to the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo, a 
surveillance ship.49
There have been various air and naval encounters over the years.  In April 1969, 
North Korea MiG jet fighters destroyed a U.S. EC-121 reconnaissance plane over the Sea 
or Japan, taking 31 lives.50  This unarmed plane was flying around 90 miles off the North 
Korean coast.51  As recently as March 2003, four North Korean fighters intercepted an 
American Air Force reconnaissance plane in international airspace above the Sea of 
Japan.52 The North Korean Navy has captured and detained numerous South Korean 
merchant ships that have entered its territorial sea.53
45 Dick K. Nanton, North Korea: Chronology of Provocations, 1950-2003, Congressional Research Service 
Report for Congress, RL30004, at 24, available at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/RL30004.pdf; THE 
INSTITUTE FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES, FOREIGN POLICY FOR PEACE AND UNIFICATION (1975) (which tracks 
the South Korean-Japanese relationship during the early 1970s); KOREAN UNIFICATION: PROBLEMS AND 
PROSPECTS (C.I. Eugene Kim ed., 1973).
46 Nanton, supra note 45, at 8-9.  One assassination plot ended up killing the wife of President Park Chung-
hee only two days before the capture of the U.S.S. Pueblo.  See also Robert S. Litwak, ROGUE STATES AND
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CONTAINMENT AFTER THE COLD WAR 202 (2000).
47 "North Korea is reported to have infiltrated a total of 3693 armed agents into South Korea from 1954 to 
1992...." Nanton, supra note 45, at 2; for more on the kidnapping by North Korea of Japanese nationals, see
Richard P. Cronin, Averting Trouble in China and North Korea: The North Korean Nuclear Threat and the 
U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Perceived Interests, Approaches, and Prospects, 29 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 51 (Winter, 2005).
48 Nanton, supra note 45, at 10.  The plane was traveling from Baghdad to Seoul.  Twenty crewmembers 
and ninety-five passengers died.  This egregious act sought to discourage participation in the Seoul 
Olympics.
49 Id. at 4.  The North Koreans killed one crew member and held eighty-two of them prisoner for eleven 
months.  See also Litwak, supra note 46. 
50 Nanton, supra note 45, at 8.
51 Id. at 5.  See also Litwak, supra note 46.
52 Nanton, supra note 45, at 25-6.
53 Stephen Kong, The Right of Innocent Passage: A Case Study on Two Koreas, 11 MINN. J. GLOBAL
TRADE 373, 375-76 (Summer, 2002).
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Military Sales
North Korea has aggressively exported ballistic missile technology over several 
decades.54  North Korea has sold this technology to countries such as Libya,55 Pakistan, 
Syria, Egypt, Iran and the United Arab Emirates,56 grossing hundreds of millions of 
dollars per year, its largest source of hard currency.57  North Korea's financial stake in the 
development and sale of missile technology drives its economy.58
In October of 2002, North Korea reportedly assisted Pakistan in developing long-
range missiles.  This activity falls in line with the intermediate range ballistic missiles 
supplied to Pakistan in the 1990's.59  In the late 1990's, it is thought that North Korea 
furnished Pakistan with twelve to twenty-five complete No-Dong medium range missiles.  
Ominously, North Korea gained from Pakistan centrifuge enrichment technology, which 
it can use (and may have already used) for producing nuclear weapons.60
54 See Joseph S. Bermudez, A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK, at
http://http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op2/op2.pdf (Apr. 12, 2004).  
55 Libya recently relinquished tons of uranium supplied to it by North Korea.
56According to the U.S. Weapons Inspector David Kay, in an interesting twist of events, Kim Jong-Il 
defrauded Saddam Hussein out of $10 million in a deal that Kim failed to fulfill.  The contract included 
ballistic missile technology and other verboten missile equipment before the 2nd Gulf War. Bermudez, 
supra note 54. See also Bob Drogin, Botched Iraqi Deal Is Detailed: CIA Advisor Says Hussein Lost $10 
Million in a Plan to Smuggle North Korean Technology That Never Went Through, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4th, 
2002.  
57 See Andrew Ward, Trade Ties Grow Between Two Koreas, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 10, 2003, at 2; see 
also Douglas Frantz, North Korea's Nuclear Success Is Doubted: Experts Question U.S. Claims about 
North's Atomic Abilities, Warning a Showdown Based on Dubious Evidence Could Further Damage Trust, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2003, at A1. 
58 See, e.g., Bertil Lintner, North Korea's Missile Trade Helps Fund Its Nuclear Program, YALEGLOBAL
(May 5, 2003), available at http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=1546.
59 See Larry A. Niksch, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, Congressional Research Service Issue 
Brief for Congress No. IB91141, at 9, available at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/IB91141.pdf (Apr. 
2004). 
60 See Sharon A. Squassoni, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: How Soon An Arsenal?, Congressional 
Research Service Report for Congress 4 No. RS 21391, at 2, available at
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/crs/RS21391.pdf (quoting Pakistan's Benazir Oversaw Korea Nuclear 
Deal-sources, Reuter News, Nov. 20, 2002).
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Such proliferation efforts have continued.  For example, a North Korean vessel 
transported Scud missiles to Yemen in December of 2002.61  A spokesman for the 
Nigerian government indicated that a North Korean delegation showed the Nigerian 
government a catalogue of weapons—but that Nigeria had not made a definite 
commitment to purchase them yet.62
Biological and Chemical Weapons in North Korea
North Korea joined the Biological Weapons Convention, an international treaty 
that for the most part does not permit even possession of biological weapons.63  However, 
it appears that North Korea has developed biological weapons such as anthrax, yellow 
fever, smallpox, cholera, and plague.64
Unlike the Biological Weapons Convention, North Korea did not sign the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.65  Consistent with their refusal to sign, North Korea has 
a formidable assemblage of such weapons.66  North Korean military doctrine asserts the 
use of chemical weapons as standard weaponry, which makes the use of chemical 
61 Id. at 24.
62 Missiles for Sale: North Korea Spreading Weapons Technology to Largest African Nation, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Jan. 30, 2004, at 10A.  
63 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, 26 U.S.T. 571, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 (1972). 
[hereinafter Biological Warfare Convention].  North Korea joined on March 13, 1987.
64 North Korea Special Weapons Guide: Biological Weapons Program, Federation of American Scientists, 
at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/bw/index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2004).  
65 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical 
Weapons and on Their Destruction, Senate Treaty Doc. 103-21, § 32 I.L.M. 800 (1993), available at
http://www.opcw.org/html/db/cwc/eng/cwcframeset.html.  
66 North Korea is purported to possess the technology to produce nerve, blister, choking and blood agents in 
large quantities.  It already has copious stockpiles of sarin and mustard gas, as well as blood agents, 
choking gases, VX and riot control agents in unknown amounts.  In all, U.S. Intelligence reports—as a low 
figure--some 180-250 tons of chemical weapons.  High estimates place the figure as between 2,500 to 
5,000 tons.  See Director of Central Intelligence ("DCI"), U.S. Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA"), 
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass 
Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, Jan. 1 through June 30, 2001 to June 30, 2001, 
available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/721reports/janjun2001.htm#5; see also North Korea Special 
Weapons Guide, supra note 64; U.S. Dep’t of Defense, Northeast Asia, Proliferation: Threat and Response
(Report 1997), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/prolif/neasia.html; Chemical Overview, at
http://www.nti.org/eresearch/profiles/NK/Chemical/.   
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weapons in a fashion akin to conventional weapons a looming concern.67  The choice not 
to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention involved conflict within the regime and 
illustrates the dominance of military considerations in this country.68
The Present Situation with North Korea
Projections Regarding Another Korean War
Military planners project that in the event of a North Korean full-scale invasion, 
the first several months of conflict could see some 300,000 to half a million casualties in 
the South Korean and U.S. militaries, as well as additional hundreds of thousands of 
civilian casualties.69  According to Doug Bandow of the Cato Institute, total casualties for 
such a war could exceed 1,000,000.70  Oplan 5027, the U.S. military's plan for the region, 
anticipates massive attacks on Seoul with artillery and rockets, possibly turning Seoul 
into a "sea of fire" through launching up to half a million shells per hour.71  A pre-
emptive strike by North Korea could inflict huge levels of casualties and damage before 
the South Korean and U.S. military could do much to block such attacks72 or pre-
emptively defang the North Korean military by military force.73  While analysts typically 
67 Attack across the DMZ Special Report, JANE’S INTELLIGENCE REV., Apr. 1, 1994.
68 This confrontation took place between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of the 
People's Armed Forces (MPAF).  The MFA briefed Kim Jong-Il on the tactical value of signing the 
Chemical Weapons Convention.  However, rather than take the MFA's advice, the Deputy Minister of the 
MFA had to complete a full year "revolutionization course" before he could resume his post.  The reason 
for this punishment was the violation of reporting rules.  Sung Chull Kim et al., NORTH KOREA IN CRISIS: 
AN ASSESSMENT OF REGIME SUSTAINABILITY, 58.  
69 R. Jeffrey Smith, North Korea Deal Urged by State Dept., WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 15, 1993, at A15; 
Drennan, supra note 10, at 191. 
70 N. Korea Is No Place to Apply Iraq Lessons, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2003, at B13.
71 Paul Richter, North Korea Crises; Two-Strategy Faces Test; Battling North Korea Amid Iraq Conflict 
Could Mean Longer Fighting and More Casualties, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at A1.
72 Phillip C. Saunders, Military Options for Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Program, Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, Jan. 27, 2003, at http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/dprkmil.htm.
73 North Korea's military assets are very numerous.  To make it even more difficult, these arms often have 
mobile capabilities or find shelter in caves or underground.  Although a number of even nuclear sites are 
known, some of the sites are heavily reinforced and armored, and other sites, such as nuclear reactors and 
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project an eventual South Korean/American victory, this victory would come at great 
price: some might call it a Pyhrric victory.74
There exists a more devious possibility that North Korea has hinted at by its firing 
of missiles over Japan, kidnapping of Japanese citizens, and other hostile actions: North 
Korea could attack U.S. bases in Japan.75  In this scenario, North Korea would seek to 
fray or split the alliance between the U.S. and South Korea, and possibly move towards 
uniting the two Koreas.  Given the rising anti-U.S. sentiment, especially among the 
younger generations of South Koreans, the tilt in the South Korean government towards 
socialism, the friendly overtures of South Korea (both governmental and private) to 
North Korea, the prevalent pro-North Korean and anti-American media bias, North 
Korean infiltrations in South Korea, and the strong desire of the Korean populace to 
unite, such a scheme takes on increased credibility.76
Regardless of whether or not North Korea attacks U.S. military bases in Japan, it 
can still attack, or threaten to attack, Japanese targets.  In one conceivable scenario, North 
Korea can blitzkrieg the South, and then threaten to destroy major Japanese cities if the 
U.S. sends reinforcements.  North Korea seeks to weaken America's will to defend South 
Korea, foment favorable political conditions in South Korea, and then wage war to 
reprocessing plants (especially for uranium) could be functional in small, underground facilities. Id; see 
also North Korean Missile Proliferation Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Security, Proliferation, & 
Fed. Services of the Comm. on Governmental Aff., 105th Cong. (1997) (Prepared Statement of Ju-Hwal 
Choi, Former Official Ministry of the People's Army North Korea) (stating since the North uses mostly 
mobile rocket launchers, not fixed ones, it is assumed that the North does not have fixed rocket launchers). 
74 See Attack Across the DMZ Special Report, supra note 67; see also Linda D. Kozaryn, Despite Progress, 
North Korea Poses Major Threat, American Forces Press Service, Apr. 3, 2001, available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2001/n04032001200104031.html; Eleanor Hall, North Korea a 
Greater Threat than Iraq, ABC Local Radio Broadcast, Australia (Feb. 13, 2003), available at
http://www.abc.net.au/worldtoday/s783676.htm; Saunders, supra note 72.
75 Hall, supra note 74. 
76 Ethnic / Social subsection, infra.
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distract their own populace from their extensive woes.77  Official North Korean policy 
maintains the objective of re-unifying Korea by force: they consider a violent Communist 
revolution of the South to be their manifest destiny.78
South Korea, for many reasons including economic, political, historical and 
humanitarian, has strong incentives to avoid the outbreak of another war on the Korean 
peninsula.79  In one form or another, war does not present itself as an attractive option.  
Resources
North Korean Military
The North Korean situation requires a delicate balance: at one extreme, the risk of 
war which would prove disastrous for the entire peninsula, and at the other extreme, the 
risk of blackmail and exploitation--where North Korea would receive the benefits that it 
would divert for its own devious ends.  It is advisable to explore both extremes in order to 
find the parameters for the best solutions.  This section of the article focuses on the 
extreme of potential war.
The devastating capabilities North Korea possesses must be kept in mind.  In 
conventional weapons alone, it is one of the leading countries in the world in total 
number of military units.  While it may be accurately stated that some of these units are 
not the most state of the art weapons available, the sheer overwhelming numbers 
nonetheless make North Korea a menacing foe indeed.  North Korea has many artillery, 
mortars, rockets, and missiles pointed and ready to turn the city of Seoul80 into rubble. 
North Korea boasts the ability to field approximately five to seven million troops; it 
77 Hwang Jang Yop, KOREA UPDATE (2002).
78 See Lee, supra note 14, at 156-58.
79 See, e.g., Saunders, supra note 72.
80 Seoul, one of the most populous cities in the world, contains about a quarter of South Korea's population.  
It sits not much more than 30 miles away from the DMZ.
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already has about 1,000,000 soldiers in its standing forces, 120,000 special operation 
forces, 11,000 forward deployed artillery pieces, 1,700 aircraft, 800 ships, 500 170-
millimeter guns, 200 multiple- launch rocket systems, 62 submarines, cave and 
underground bases, air defense weapons, mobile missile launchers and other potential 
causes of military mayhem.81
One of the questions that remain is what sort of missile delivery technology does 
North Korea possess and is that technology sufficient to deliver a nuclear warhead to the 
United Stated of America?  It is safe to say presently that North Korea has the missile 
delivery technology to strike South Korea and Japan, and, if they so foolishly desired, to 
strike various parts of China as well.82  The huge population densities of both South 
Korea and Japan would make such weapons, especially nuclear weapons, particularly 
destructive as they would take more lives per square mile than other locales—due to the 
greater number of people per unit of area.  
While the might of the U.S. military would likely be able to eventually win or at 
least maintain or return to the status quo in a fight against North Korea alone, it would do 
so at great cost.  The cost of human lives and property on the Korean peninsula would 
likely dwarf the casualties suffered during the first Korean War.83
Additionally and more alarming is the possibility for another Korean war to draw 
in China.84  After all, during the Korean War, it was the Chinese forces that turned back 
81 See Saunders, supra note 72; Kathleen T. Rhem, North Korean Military “Very Credible Conventional 
Force”, American Forces Press Service (Nov. 18, 2003), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Nov2003/n11182003200311181.html (citing Gen. Leon LaPorte, USA, 
Commander of U.S. forces in South Korea). See also Hall, supra note 74. 
82 See, e.g., Pinkston et al., supra note 12.
83 E.g., Kongdan Oh, The Problem and Promise of Inter-Korean Economic Cooperation, KOREA BRIEFING: 
TOWARD REUNIFICATION 25-48 (David R. McCann, ed., 1997).
84 But see Charles M. Perry & Toshi Yoshihara, THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 78 (2003) (China told 
Pyongyang in the mid-90s that China will not participate in any future Korean conflict).
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the U.N. forces as they were approaching the Yalu River near the Chinese border.  China 
would want to maintain North Korea as a buffer between it and South Korea, both 
geographically and ideologically.85
The U.S. Military Presence on the Korean Peninsula
Nuclear: The U.S. nuclear presence in Korea has steadily dwindled to none.  In 
1967, the U.S. had over 800 nuclear weapons south of the DMZ.86  That number 
decreased to around 600 by 1977, 151 by 1985,87 and in 1991, the U.S. removed all of its 
nuclear weapons from Korea.88  However, because the U.S. has long-range delivery 
systems, the presence of nuclear weapons in Korea—or even Asia—carries less 
significance than if the U.S. had only mid-range or short-range delivery abilities.89
Conventional: The Army has 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea.  These 
troops have ample equipment, such as Apache helicopters and Patriot missile batteries.90
The largest forward-deployed fleet of the Navy, the 7th Fleet, rests not far from the 
shores of North Korea.91  Around 200 aircraft, forty to fifty ships,92 and some 20,000 
Navy and Marine personnel constitute the 7th Fleet.93 Air Force deployment in the 
85 James Hoare & Susan Pares, CONFLICT IN KOREA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 145 (1999).
86 Robert S. Norris et al., Where They Were, 55 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 6, 26-35 (1999), available at
http://www.bullatommsci.org/issues/1999/nd99/nd99norris.html. 
87 Id.; Robert S. Norris & William M. Arkin, Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Locations, 51 
BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 6 (1995), available at
http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/nd95nukenote.html.
88 South Korea was the last forward nuclear base for the U.S. in the Pacific.  See Cumings, supra note 25; 
see also Benjamin Friedman, Nuclear Issues, Fact Sheet: North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program, Ctr. 
for Def. Info. (Jan. 23, 2003), at http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/nk-fact-sheet.cfm.
89 See Charles J. Moxley, Jr., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE POST COLD WAR
WORLD 501-514 (2000).
90 U.S. Forces Order of Battle, at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/korea-orbat.htm (Mar. 17, 
2004).
91 Forward Presence, U.S. Navy, Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet, at
http://www.c7f.navy.mil/New/Pages/Forward%20presence.html.
92 Id. The ships typically include three to five Aegis guided-missile cruisers, five to ten destroyers and 
frigates, and one to two aircraft carriers.
93 Id.  Eighteen of these ships use Japan as their base. 
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Pacific numbers 45,000 military and civilian personnel—with about 300 fighter and 
attack aircraft under its control.94  The Seventh Air Force perches in Korea with the Fifth 
in Japan.95
These forces in the Pacific, some in and around Korea and Japan, can respond 
rapidly to an outbreak of hostilities.  At the same time, the ability to quickly deploy 
additional military resources enables rapid reinforcement of the present numbers.  
South Korean Resources
Military: With mandatory military service for male citizens, South Korea can 
mobilize approximately 4,500,000 well-equipped soldiers with newer armaments than 
their North Korean counterparts, such as over 3000 tanks and 1500 strike aircraft.96
Approximately 5,300 mortars and two surface-to-surface battalions add to the South 
Korean military resources.97
Economic: The robust South Korean economy, once the second to poorest at the 
end of the Korean War, now stands as the 12th largest economy in the world, with a per 
capita GNP of U.S. $10,000.98  It would have large capabilities to sustain a war effort, if 
those capabilities would not already find themselves devastated by a North Korean 
attack.  However, after another war with North Korea, the South Korean economy might 
94 Pacific Air Forces, at http://www.osan.af.mil/Facts/Pacific%20Air%20Forces.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 
2004).
95 U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, at 
http://www.usa.or.th/services/docs/reports/ussec1.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2004).  The Seventh Air Force 
includes the Fifty-first and Eighth Fighter Wings, with a combined 117 planes and 8,300 air force 
personnel.  The Fifty-first uses A-10 aircraft as well as three squadrons of F-16 fighter aircraft.  See also
7th Air Force, at http://www.osan.af.mil/Facts/7th%20Air%20Force.htm (last modified Apr. 2003).
96 Kozaryn, supra note 74.
97 Orders of Battle and Major Equipment: South Korean and North Korea, at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/orbat-comp.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004). 
98 Background Note: South Korea, Bureau of East Asian & Pacific Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, at
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.ntm (Mar. 2003).
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end up flattened even more than after the first Korean War99 because there exists more to 
destroy—whether infrastructure, industry, edifices or people. 
Kim Jong-Il
On the other extreme from full-out warfare are the problems that result from 
deceit and blackmail in the political arena.  In the case of North Korea, politics flows 
from the top, North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Il.  Early intelligence wrongfully assessed 
Kim Jong-Il as unintelligent.  Later intelligence corrected this earlier assessment, and 
concluded instead that Kim possesses a high-powered intellect.  Estimates of his I.Q. 
have placed it at around 160.
Kim Il Sung groomed his son Kim Jong Il to take the reins of power from him 
starting from the early 1970s.100  As Korean Workers Party Secretary, he ran the 
organization, including its propaganda function.101  In 1980, the Sixth Party Congress 
named him the official successor.102
  In 1991, Kim Jong Il ascended to the position of Supreme Commander of the 
People's Army and Chairman of the National Defense Committee in 1993.103  Throughout 
this time, propaganda deifying Kim Jong Il drummed its way into the day-to-day life of 
North Korea.104
According to defectors from North Korea itself, the North Korean populace, in 
spite of the propaganda, knows about Kim Jong Il's immoral behavior, the failure of his 
99 Prof. Bruce Howard asserted that war in a country devastates a country's economy more than anything 
else. Economics Lecture, (1996).
100 Sung Chull Kim et al., supra note 68, at 35; Sang-Woo Rhee, SECURITY AND UNIFICATION OF KOREA 7 
(1983).
101 Sung Chull Kim et al., supra note 100.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 35-6.
104 Id. at 36.
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economic policies, and the politicized nature of his inner circle.105  The deterioration of 
the country on many fronts would tend to diminish the glorified image of this totalitarian 
dictator.106
The Present Crisis
History of the Geneva Protocol
The 1994 Agreed Framework107 resulted from intensive negotiations, and marked 
a departure from the otherwise relatively uniform policy of the Clinton administration to 
what it termed "rogue states".  The policy towards North Korea, dubbed "limited 
engagement by necessity", emerged out of heated discussion and debate, both within the 
Clinton administration and also with the Republican-led Congress.108
During this debate, the range of options considered included pre-emptive strikes 
of the known nuclear facilities, proposed sanctions, and a negotiated agreement with 
North Korea.109  Even a focused pre-emptive attack solely on the nuclear facilities carried 
with it, even according to the military leaders at the time, too much risk of a full-blown 
war.110  The Clinton administration actually started pursuing the sanctions option when a 
visit to Pyongyang by former president Jimmy Carter derailed such efforts.111
With the reluctant permission of President Clinton (permission that president 
George H.W. Bush had previously refused to give), Jimmy Carter went on a peacemaking 
mission to Pyongyang.112  Upon Carter's return, he pronounced the end of the crisis 
105 Id. at 38.
106 See Id.
107 Agreed Framework to Negotiate Resolution of the Nuclear Issue on the Korean Peninsula, Oct. 21, 
1994, U.S.-N. Korea, 34 I.L.M. 603.
108 Gills, supra note 7, at 234-43.
109 Litwak, supra note 46.
110 Id.
111 Id.; Drennan, supra note 10, at 159. 
112 Litwak, supra note 109, at 175-77.
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through getting Kim Il Sung's agreement to freeze North Korea's nuclear program under 
IAEA inspections, and to come back to the bargaining table with the then current U.S. 
administration.113
This trip served as a catalyst for the negotiations that led to the Geneva Protocol, 
also known as the Agreed Framework.114  The planned initial meeting between the DPRK 
and the US in Geneva found itself suspended due to the demise of Kim Il Sung, the self-
styled "Great Leader" who had ruled North Korea from its inception until July 9th, 1994.
After a one-month delay, the negotiation resumed.  A joint statement emerged on
August 12th, which announced the core of the agreement.  Ambassador Gallucci and 
First Vice Foreign Minister concluded it on October 17th, and signed it on October 21st.
The four-page document was a carefully crafted agreement implementing the 
DPRK’s transition from graphite-moderated nuclear reactors to light water reactors.115
This transition was scheduled to take place over a decade, buttressed by substantial 
commitments from the US to replace lost generating capacity through shipments of heavy 
oil.116  The agreement met resistance from some quarters as a "sellout and an act of 
appeasement."117  Others hailed it as a major achievement for peace on the peninsula.118
Breach of the Agreement and the Current Situation
As events have unfolded afterwards, it has become obvious that North Korea has 
materially breached the Agreed Framework.  In 1998, U.S. intelligence discovered a large 
113 Gills, supra note 108; Drennan, supra note 111, at 177.
114 Agreed Framework, supra note 107. 
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Litwak, supra note 109, at 220.
118 Of course, the Clinton administration was under the misapprehension that the North Korean regime was 
not long for this world.  They felt “the Agreed Framework is almost certainly a sufficient period of time for 
their regime to have collapsed.”  Id. at 227.
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underground facility that could support nuclear weapon development.119  In a meeting 
with Ambassador Kelly, a North Korean official disclosed North Korea's present 
possession of nuclear weaponry, a statement later denied by Pyongyang.120  During this 
very year (2005), North Korea publicly announced that it had already developed nuclear 
weapons.
Given the breach of contract, KEDO suspended shipment of heavy oil and 
scrapped the Light Water Reactor (LWR) project.  North Korea claimed U.S. breach of 
the agreement and stated that it must develop and produce nuclear weapons as a deterrent 
against potential American aggression, which they claim to genuinely fear.121  North 
Korea then withdrew from the ongoing six party talks—formerly involving itself, South 
Korea, the U.S., Japan, China, and Russia.  The Bush administration has refused to 
engage in bilateral negotiations thus far with Pyongyang in an effort to avoid what it sees 
as blackmail.  
Various Responses to North Korea
North Korea’s behavior regarding nuclear weapons has led many American 
sources, ranging from scholars and politicians to comedians and talk show hosts, to 
suggest that North Korea acts and speaks in a crazy and irrational manner.122 While it 
may be correct to speak about North Korea in this fashion if one incorporates a moral 
dimension to those statements, it is inaccurate in terms of whether or not North Korea’s 
behavior and speech is logically connected with their own goals and objectives. 
119 Id. at 222, 225; see also No Nukes Warning from Clinton to N. Korea, CNN.COM (Nov. 21, 1998), 
available at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9811/21/korea.01/index.html.
120 See, e.g., Timeline, supra note 11; North Korea Chronology, supra note 11.
121 Pinkston et al., supra note 12. 
122 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 14; David Letterman, when discussing North Korea, frequently refers to Kim 
Jong Il and his son “Menta Lee Il (Mentally Ill),” and the recent movie Team America: World Police
portrayed an ego-maniacal Kim Jong-Il as the primary villain.
North Korea Nuclear Crisis 21
North Korea has a goal of holding on to power, of removing American 
involvement in the peninsula, of reunifying Korea by force, and of wresting benefits from 
other countries through the use of threats and coercion due to the deteriorated condition 
of their own country.  Understanding these goals will help one to make sense of North 
Korea’s actions—as insidious as many of these resulting activities have been. Though 
dangerous and seemingly desperate, the actions of North Korea are not irrational or 
illogical.  Perhaps the single biggest mistake by the United States and South Korea in past 
dealings with North Korea has been to ignore or misinterpret this logic. This section 
analyzes past dealings in four major areas—military, political, economic, and ethnic—to 
show that past responses to North Korea have been inadequate or wrong-headed. Then, it 
recommends better solutions for dealing in each of these four areas. The article then 
concludes by focusing on potential solutions relating to international legal theory. 
Military
Background
As the preceding sections make clear, North Korea’s most obvious—and, for the 
world, dangerous—goals are militaristic: holding on to power in its totalitarian 
dictatorship, reunifying Korea by force, and extracting benefits from other countries 
through the use of threats and coercion.123 It should be no surprise that North Korea has 
continued with its belligerent and hostile actions towards the United States and South 
Korea repeatedly since the cease-fire--whether a naval battle with South Korea, frequent 
border skirmishes, or intentional incursions into South Korea of thousands of armed 
123 Lee, supra note 14, at152. 
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agents.124 These actions have extended to Japan as well.125 Time after time, North Korea 
has persistently sought these aforementioned objectives, often in overtly hostile ways.
Past Military Responses
As the sections above make clear, the response of key countries such as South 
Korea, the United States, and Japan have been to reduce their military force relative to 
North Korea. Because North Korea’s goal is to unify Korea, by force if necessary, then 
such a response moves in the wrong direction. For example, one devious way in which 
North Korea may seek to start a war is by having their own soldiers dressed in South 
Korean military uniforms pretending like they are invading North Korea, and in response 
to this phony incursion, North Korea attacking South Korea with the justification of 
having been "attacked" first. They have actually had military exercises where they are 
practicing such a subterfuge.
Recommended Military Solutions
A better solution would be for these nations to increase the defensive capabilities 
of their military. The South Korean military should ready itself because the belligerent 
rhetoric of North Korea has sometimes spilled into combat, and a very important thing 
that South Korea needs to do is have enough of a deterrent--especially in terms of 
defensive measures--readily at hand.126  Such measures should discourage the outbreak of 
war, and send a clear message to North Korea that they would meet vigorous resistance 
and ultimately find defeat if they instigate another war.
124 See, e.g., Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., TERRORISM: THE NORTH KOREAN CONNECTION 24-54 (1990); Sang-
Woo Rhee, supra note 100, at 210. 
125 See, e.g., Bermudez, Jr., supra note 124, at 146-154.  North Korean agents kidnapped at least thirteen 
Japanese nationals, forcing them to teach language and culture while using their identities to infiltrate 
South Korea and Japan. Robert J. Lundin III, Note, International Justice: Who Should Be Held Responsible 
for Kidnapping of Thirteen Japanese Citizens? 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 699, 700-701 (Fall, 
2001).
126 E.g., James Hoare & Susan Pares, CONFLICT IN KOREA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA, xxiii (1999).
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Another option is for Japan to indicate it will bolster its military in order to defend 
against the North Korean threat, which perhaps could motivate China to persuade North 
Korea to disarm.127 In recent years Japan has taken a harder line toward North Korea, but 
so far has increased only its defensive and not offensive capabilities.128 If it looks like the 
US is behind that effort though (as in the efforts of U.S. Rep. Tom Lantos), then perhaps 
it would not achieve the desired effect. 
Finally, the US should at least send greater defensive reinforcements, such as 
more Patriot missile batteries.129 The emphasis on defense forecloses reasonable pretexts 
for North Korea to attack pre-emptively by considering buildup of offensive capabilities 
as an indicator of imminent U.S. attack.  North Korea might try to claim that America is 
building up its military forces in and around the peninsula in order to attack North Korea:  
Pyongyang could, for example, draw analogies with of the military buildup in Iraq prior 
to that war.130  However, primarily defensive reinforcements would at once take away 
such an excuse while preparing for a possible attack by North Korea.
Political
Background
The North Korean pattern of brinkmanship or "negotiating on the edge"—as Scott 
Snyder has put it in his book by that title, and as shown in a recent book on North Korean 
negotiation strategy—is in five steps: 1) escalate the crisis; 2) use it to gain bargaining 
127 See, e.g., Perry & Yoshihara, supra note 84, at 47, 81, 130.
128 Cronin, supra note 47, at 53-54; see also Christopher W. Hughes, Japan-North Korea Relations: 
Obstacles to a Breakthrough, in COOPERATION AND REFORM ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA 28 (James M. 
Lister, ed., Korea Economic Institute 2002).
129 Cf. Jong Chul Park, KOREA’S ENGAGEMENT POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 
TO THE U.S., 16-17 (July, 2001); Perry & Yoshihara, supra note 127, at 138-46. 
130 Drennan, surpa note 10, at 190.  The U.S.-South Korean alliance has been and will continue to be a 
primary deterrent against North Korean aggression, so that these two nations must not only continue but 
must strengthen their ties. Stephen W. Bosworth, U.S.-Korean Relations after the Summit, 25 FLETCHER F. 
WORLD AFF. 25, 27 (Winter, 2001).
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leverage, to get the desired parties (most particularly the U.S.) to the table, such as the 
Clinton administration for bi-lateral negotiations; 3) as a result of the crisis, to come to an 
agreement which 4) gives them benefits, which they swallow; and then 5) not abide by 
their promises, break the agreement, and create another crisis—thus starting this cycle 
again.131
What must also be recognized is that deception and breaking of their word has 
been the norm, not the exception, for North Korea. In addition to North Korea's deception 
of the international community, it extends as well to the steady stream of lies that it 
pumps to its populace. Its propaganda states ridiculous things: that South Korea is in 
much worse economic condition than North Korea; the outlandish deification of the 
dictator Kim Jong Il; the ever present threat of attack from South Korea and the United 
States; and the false promises that a communist utopia will come about if the populace 
just perseveres a little bit longer.132 Also, North Korea levels a steady stream of wild 
accusations against South Korea and the US that probably would better describe what 
North Korea has done and where it stands rather than what either South Korea or the US 
has done against North Korea.133
One recurring problem involves North Korean efforts to negotiate directly with 
the U.S. while sidelining South Korea.  Given the continuing North Korean policy that 
131 Hyun Joon Chon, Characteristics of North Korea’s South Korean Policy, in KINU RESEARCH
ABSTRACTS ’02 39-44 (2003); Scott Snyder, NEGOTIATING ON THE EDGE: NORTH KOREAN NEGOTIATING 
BEHAVIOR (1999); Litwak, supra note 46, at 226 (“[they] understand that there is no alternative to 
brinkmanship”).
132 See, e.g., Kim-Il Sung, FOR THE INDEPENDENT PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF KOREA (1975); Li Jong 
Mok, ON THE QUESTION OF KOREA: SPEECHES OF REPRESENTATIVES AT THE 30TH SESSION OF THE U.N. 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1-25 (1976); Park Chung Hee, North Korean Communists’ Deceptive Double Tactics, 
New Year Press Conference (January 18, 1974), reprinted in TOWARD PEACEFUL UNIFICATION (1978); 
Park Chung Hee, Peace Propaganda & Warlike Provocations (1978), Special Statement on Third 
Anniversary of the South-North Joint Communique (July 4, 1975), reprinted in TOWARD PEACEFUL 
UNIFICATION (1978).
133 E.g., Kim-Il Sung, supra note 132; Text of Kim Il Sung’s Speech at Pyongyang Mass Meeting (June 23, 
1973), in KOREAN UNIFICATION 340 (Se-Jin Kim, ed., 1976).
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fails to officially recognize or engage in official diplomacy with South Korea,134 and 
continues on the path of seeking forceful reunification, there exist continuing tensions 
about how to conduct multilateral negotiations.135
Responses to North Korean Deceit and Brinkmanship
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice recently responded to North Korean 
accusations that the US is hostile to North Korea and is about to wage war and attack 
North Korea. Secretary Rice called such rhetoric ridiculous--that there exist no war plans 
against North Korea presently.  These recent accusations amount to nothing more than 
the continued spewing of the North Korean propaganda machine, the lineup of lies that it 
regularly puts forth to its populace.136
Although these actions by Rice indicate an awareness of North Korean tactics, 
other parts of our government do not seem to appreciate fully how North Korea operates. 
Pronouncements by Representative Curt Weldon, who was part of a recent Congressional 
delegation to North Korea, appear overly optimistic. Shortly after their return, he claimed 
that North Korea anticipated de-nuclearizing.137 Not long after that press conference, in a 
matter of weeks, North Korea announced unabashedly to the world that it possessed 
134 The 2000 Summit remains a insubstantial anomaly that achieved greater support from South Korea to 
North Korea while ultimately giving South Korea very little.  North Korea lost next to nothing by agreeing 
to the reunion of families, its largest "concession".
135 For a more thorough discussion of the need for all six nations to be involved, and why no single nation 
should predominate, see Ilpyong J. Kim, The Major Powers and the Korean Triangle, in TWO KOREAS—
ONE FUTURE?: A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, 119-34 (John 
Sullivan & Roberta Foss, eds., 1987).
136 See Pinkston et al., supra note 12.  See also Glenn Kessler, Three Little Words Matter to N. Korea; Bush 
Has Avoided 'No Hostile Intent,' WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 2005, at A10 (the Bush administration repeatedly 
states that it has no intention to invade North Korea, but backs away from the Clinton-era phrase ‘no hostile 
intent’).
137 Jason Motlagh, North Korea: Denuclearization is Final Goal, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, available at
http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20050119-102012-8082r.htm; Glenn Kessler, N. Korea Talks 
May Hinge on Bush, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2005, at A23.
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nuclear weapons.138 The ranking democratic foreign relations committee member (Tom 
Lantos) drew a parallel in a speech at John Hopkins’ School of Advanced International 
Studies (SAIS) the example of Libya reaping economic and political benefits from 
voluntarily disarming their arsenal of weapons of mass destruction.139  Such a prospect 
does not reflect North Korea's past patterns of behavior.140
Recommended Political Solutions
While Representative Lantos acknowledged that it is a "longshot" that North 
Korea would go the path of Libya, his words nonetheless indicate members of the U.S. 
Congress want to take a softer approach than the Bush administration.141 The present 
administration’s insistence on six party talks over bilateral negotiations directly with 
North Korea helps to counter North Korea’s attempt to go over the head of South Korea--
and for that matter over the heads of its regional neighbors--to directly negotiate with the 
US.142 Such bilateral talks, which led to the 1994 Agreed Framework, not only failed, but 
also gave additional time for North Korea to become more dangerous and to reap benefits 
without meeting its obligations. The present administration’s approach, whatever its 
overall merits, at least avoids such blackmail.
138 Motlagh, supra note 137; see also Michael Duffy, What Does North Korea Want? TIME (Feb. 13, 2005), 
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,1027498,00.html.
139 Lantos on North Korea broadcast on C-SPAN (2005).
140 Tom Lantos, Is Libya the Future of North Korea? (Feb. 14, 2005), available at http://www.sais-
jhu.edu/pubaffairs/SAISarticles05/Lantos_Speech.pdf; see also Adam Wolfe, U.S. Attempts to Make an 
Example Out of Libya Will Fail (Apr. 28, 2004), available at
http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=163&language_id=1; Henry Sokolski, The 
Qaddafi Precedent, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Jan. 26, 2004), available at http://www.npec-
web.org/published/qaddafi2.htm.
141 With a new Secretary of State, it is possible there may be some variations from the prior Secretary in 
terms of how such matters are approached.
142 U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea Stephen W. Bosworth notes the advantage of multi-party 
talks over bilateral negations because the former build broad regional consensus that supports North-South 
dialogue and cooperation. Supra note 130. 
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Lantos did parlay a tactic might help the U.S. politically, although it may have 
helped even more if the speaker came from elsewhere than the U.S.: he had spoken to 
leaders in China and indicated how it was in China’s interest to see that North Korea got 
rid of its weapons of mass destruction because of the possibility of Japan’s re-arming to 
defend and deter North Korean potential aggression with such weapons.143 Given the 
history of hostilities that historically had transpired between China and Japan, China 
would not want Japan to rearm. Thus, Lantos used the approach that former secretary of 
state George Schultz had suggested would be an effective way to motivate China to step 
in to help disarm North Korea.144
Economic
Background
If North Korea merely diminished its military spending by approximately five to 
ten percent, then it could potentially feed its starving populace; yet, it refuses to do so. It 
has preferred artillery, tanks, and fighter planes to rice, kimchi (Korean pickled 
vegetables), and kalbi (Korean style marinated short ribs)--thus deciding to be armed to 
the teeth while turning their populace into ragged skeletons.
The Korea Institute for National Unification (“KINU”) published an interesting 
empirical study that takes the factors used by Zbigniew Brezizinski, formally prominent 
in the Carter administration and now a scholar in the field of international relations, 
where he examined various different factors to measure the degree of crisis within 
regimes in Eastern Europe to help to predict whether they would be experiencing 
143 Hamish McDonald, Japan's Prominent Role in Coral Sea Exercise Will Unsettle China, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Sept. 15, 2003, at 8.
144 See, e.g., Steven Kamara, Schultz '42 Discusses Solutions to Nuclear Threat from North Korea, DAILY
PRINCETONIAN (Apr. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.dailyprincetonian.com/archives/2003/04/14/news/7921.shtml.
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impending collapse, transformation, regime change, and other similar events.145 KINU 
took the Breszinski factors, added some of their own that were appropriate to the North 
Korean context, and measured to what extent the North Korean regime is in crisis and the 
probability that it would implode. Their conclusion, after analysis of political, social, 
economic, cultural, and other factors, was that even through 1995—when their 
measurements ended—North Korea had already entered a crisis level.146 Many of those 
factors were on a downward trend, meaning that they were degenerating, potentially 
leading to regime transformation or regime change if these trends were not reversed.147
Incentives, Trade, and Humanitarian Aid in Response
Ten years later, if one presumes that at least the majority of those factors have 
grown worse, then North Korea has grown closer and closer to imploding from within. 
The initial implementation of economic free-enterprise zones may have helped to start to 
reverse their economic woes, but more likely, a greater factor in helping sustain North 
Korea, as was mentioned earlier, is increased trade and aid, most particularly from South 
Korea. From 1985 to 1996, there was 1.2 billion dollars worth of trade from South Korea 
to North Korea. Predominantly, the amount flowing from North Korea to South Korea 
was miniscule, but the numbers have been increasing since that time.148
The head of Hyundai, one of the two giant conglomerates in Korea, has been 
funding various projects, including the Mount Guhmgahng tourism, as well as an entire 
industrial zone, various donations and provision of funds for infrastructure.149 That type 
145 Sung Chull Kim et al., supra note 68, at 124.
146 Id. at 124.
147 Id. at 126.
148 In a historic move, North Korea actually shipped shirts to South Korea in 2005.
149 Young Whan Kihl, The DPRK and its Relations with the ROK, in KOREA BRIEFING 1997-1999 139 
(Kongdan Oh, ed., 2000).
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of aid from various South Korean sources has been increasing, and increasing 
dramatically. China is another major source of aid and trade, but Russia has diminished 
its aid to North Korea due to its own economic woes.150 What must be realized is that 
North Korea only engages the international community to the extent that it thinks it can 
benefit from such interaction while continuing to pursue its own inimical goals. While 
North Korea may have established diplomatic relationships with 140 countries, the depth 
of the relationships extend no further than the instrumental pursuit of its own interests at 
best. 
North Korea claims that if it just gets sufficient humanitarian aid, then it would be 
sustained thereby. The root problem is more foundational, though: its economic system 
has failed.151 North Korea is, however, experimenting with economic free enterprise 
zones, which seem to be a step in the right direction as far as increasing production. They 
have remained, however, unwilling to cut military spending, which would free the 
necessary resources to be able to feed their country. The means to be able to help their 
citizens, and the people inside North Korea, is within their own grasp, but rather than 
increasing overall production, they even cut food rations to a portion of their populace 
during the latter part of the 1990's. 
Obviously, to help open up the society and the economy, North Korea should 
implement reforms that move towards a more free-market, capitalistic system that 
rewards industriousness, productivity and enterprise. It has made slight steps in that 
direction as mentioned, and trade, especially with South Korea, has increased 
150 Perry & Yoshihara, supra note 84, at 84-87.
151 Compare the 1999 per capita incomes and total trade of the two nations. North Korea was at $714 per 
person and $1.48 billion in trade, while South Korea stood at $8,581 and $263.5 billion. Sung Chul Yang, 
South Korea’s Sunshine Policy: Progress and Predicaments, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 31, 32 (Winter, 
2001).
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dramatically—even as it has evaporated with almost the entire rest of the world. But 
North Korean so- called “trade” is more charity than anything else, where South Korea is 
helping North Korea, and getting little to nothing in return, except the continued 
animosity and hostility of the Pyongyang regime.152
Representative Lantos indicated that sanctions against North Korea already exist. 
One scholar suggests that U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea have not worked 
to force North Korea to change. However, these sanctions provide a bargaining chip that 
allows the U.S. to maintain a policy of containment and appeasement that at least keeps 
the crisis on the Korean peninsula from worsening.153
A More Hands-Off Solution to Economic Development
To promote change, however, a better approach would be at the very least, 
continued containment and deterrance, where nations such as Japan and the U.S.—and 
especially South Korea—take the path of patiently waiting, and perhaps in some ways 
accelerating, an internal implosion--the demise of North Korea from within.  This would 
require nothing more than ceasing, or at least dramatically reducing, trade and 
humanitarian aid so that North Korea would be forced to negotiate more broadly—and 
more honestly.154 Current trade and humanitarian efforts are undoubtedly paved with 
good intentions and compassion.  However, they also help to reinforce a terrible regime, 
one that has miserably failed its people, so that such aid may be delaying the internal 
152 The large cost of reconstructing north Korea’s collapsed economic infrastructure “will have to be 
carried, in effect, on the balance sheets of South Korea’s government, South Korea’s corporations, and, 
ultimately, South Korea’s households.” Bosworth, supra note 130, at 28.
153 Paul VanWagenen, Note, U.S. Economic Sanctions—Non-Traditional Success against North Korea, 32 
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 239 (2000); see also Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1491 (May, 2003) (arguing that sanctions phasedown and increased food aid would 
improve U.S.-North Korean talks).
154 International organizations and other nations provide North Korea with hundreds of thousands of tons of 
food aid, and South Korea provides over 35 percent of the humanitarian assistance. Yang, supra note 151, 
at 32.
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collapse of North Korea. The one drawback is that North Korea may respond to 
economic reductions with military force; thus, South Korea and her allies must maintain a 
substantial military deterrent as outlined above.
One can argue that even if North Korea will collapse, it is better for them to 
collapse with better economic conditions in order to alleviate the burden of South Korea, 
as well as other nations and organizations that would help. However, it seems that given 
the determination of Kim Jong Il and his regime to hold on to power at all costs, and to 
orient the whole regime to maintaining a grip on power rather than serving the common 
good of the populace that exists there, it is highly likely that aid to North Korea would 
only tend to increase the grip that Kim Jong Il and his cronies have on this country, 
especially given the diversion of aid to government and military personnel rather than the 
peasants who need it most.155
Ethnic and Nationalistic Propaganda
Background
Hwang Jang Yop156 indicated that North Korea is seeking to foment favorable 
political conditions within South Korea. These efforts seem to be working on various 
different fronts. For example, the current and immediate past president, as well as many 
155 Kongdan Oh calls those who favor trade the engagement school, while those who think that all 
economic aid to North Korea should be avoided are the confrontation school. Oh suggests that economic 
dealing with North Korea will help only North Korea in the short term, but that eventually South Korea will 
need to expand and integrate to sustain its growth. The Problem and Promise of Inter-Korean Economic 
Cooperation, in KOREA BRIEFING: TOWARD REUNIFICATION 25-48, 45-46 (David R. McCann, ed., 1997).
156 Hwang Jang Yop, the highest level defector from North Korea, has dedicated the remainder of his life to 
try to find the path of peace for the Korean peninsula.  No better or higher insider view exists of the 
reclusive North Korean regime.  Previously, he had served as president of the most prestigious university in 
North Korea, Kim Il Sung University.  Also, he had headed up the now defunct legislature.  Overall, he 
held the 24th highest position in the North Korean hierarchy.  Hwang also formulated the Juche
philosophy, the primary propaganda framework for North Korea.  After defecting, he considered himself a 
criminal for his complicity with such a regime:  he deeply regrets his involvement at the highest levels of 
the North Korean government.  One of my law students translated for him when he addressed the U.S. 
Congress in 2004. 
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members of the South Korean legislature, have socialist tendencies, which is moving in 
the direction towards the failed communism that has been happening in North Korea. 
From the government, there increasingly have been elements that have been favorable 
towards North Korea and its system—which is strange, given the domestic disaster that is 
North Korea, and the relative paradise by comparison that South Korea has become. 
Additionally, according to the Seoul bureau chief of Time Magazine,157 the South 
Korean media is reluctant to report North Korean abuse and aggression, whether to Japan 
or to South Korea itself, but it is quick to trumpet stories that magnify any real or 
perceived transgression of a soldier or any one else from the US. There has emerged a 
naiveté combined with wishful thinking about the intentions of North Korea, and a willful 
disbelief of the bellicose intentions of North Korea on the part of a good number of South 
Korean youth, who never experienced the Korean War. The Time Magazine bureau chief 
said when he visited the law school at which I served as a founding professor that the 
South Korean media tends to downplay or even ignore a lot of North Korean acts of 
aggression, whether it be sending submarines down to South Korea where spies emerge 
and infiltrate, or naval skirmishes between North and South Korea near the borderline, or 
North Korea’s wrongful actions against Japan, such as the kidnapping of innocent 
Japanese civilians conscripted into teaching North Korea officials Japanese. These stories 
receive relatively low or little press, whereas anything that seems even remotely like a 
U.S. soldier doing wrong, the headlines magnify disproportionately. 158  Such reporting 
tends to drive a wedge between South Korea and the US.  North Korea actively has 
157 Speech delivered at Handong International Law School in 2004.
158 For example, large demonstrations followed the acquittal of two U.S. soldiers who were acquitted by 
U.S., as opposed to South Korean, tribunals of negligent homicide for running over two South Korean girls 
in 2002. Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Criminal Jurisdiction under the U.S.-Korea Status of Forces Agreement: 
Problems to Proposals, 13 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 213, 215-16 (Fall, 2003).
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sought to take advantage of, and deepen, any rifts or disagreements between these allies, 
as well as with other involved countries (such as Japan, Russia and China). 
In addition, South Korean media and other sources, such as books, have tended to 
demonize the US while indicating attractive points of North Korea.  These sources have 
helped to inculcate in the younger generations a sizable degree of anti-Americanism as 
well as pro-North Korean sentiments.159 North Korea regularly seeks to implant anti-
American and pro-North Korean propaganda in South Korea, and it seems that they have 
done so successfully to a large extent. As an example, North Korea likes to say that it has 
to liberate South Korea from US imperialism and domination, and thus, damages the 
pride of South Korea by in essence speaking of South Korea as if it were a colony under 
the thumb of the US.160
Recently, a professor at Seoul National University (considered the leading 
university in South Korea) who had taught sociology in Seoul National University for 
over 30 years was recently discovered to be a North Korean spy when two fellow spies 
were linked to him.  These spies confessed that this professor emeritus had been a North 
Korean spy all along. North Korea has thus been able to infiltrate influential centers of 
South Korean culture, and the culture, sadly enough, seems to be swallowing more of the 
North Korean propaganda161 —and other reinforcing messages.  Ironically enough, such 
devious communication exists in South Korea because as a developing democracy, it 
allows incomparably more freedom of speech than North Korea. 
159 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 14.
160 Jong Chul Park, supra note 68, at 18-19.
161 Gregory Henderson writes that North Korea “rules through exceedingly concerted and consistent 
propaganda and socialization programs in an isolated polity.” The Politics of Korea, in TWO KOREAS—
ONE FUTURE?: A REPORT PREPARED FOR THE AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE 95, 108 (John 
Sullivan & Roberta Foss, eds., 1987).
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There are also appeals to Korean nationalism, such that the common bond of 
Korean ethnicity is touted as being more important than other pieces of common ground, 
such as the extensive common ground that the US and South Korea share, both in terms 
of their inner relationship, but also the common ground in terms of their systems. North 
Korea is an entirely different sort of society economically, politically, religiously, 
socially--in all these ways.  There exists much more common ground, and much more of 
a relationship between South Korea and the US, than between South Korea and North
Korea.162  The South Korean media, a significant portion of university students, and now 
many government elements in South Korea are sympathetic with the North Korean 
regime, sees the U.S. as a big bully against North Korea and an exploiter of South Korea, 
and sees North Korea as one of us, "our people," as fellow ethnic Koreans. For many 
especially in the generations in South who did not experience the Korea War, it is 
possible that affinities with the U.S. politically, socially, economically, and legally can be 
overshadowed by the common ethnic blood that is shared between North and South 
Korea.
Playing into this misguided identity politics is the strong nationalism of Koreans 
as Koreans (not North and South Koreans) and a strong sense of ethnic identity that has 
not only survived many invasions, many attacks, and many attempts to dominate or even 
colonize it, but has grown stronger in resistance against outside attacks. That being the 
case, they are susceptible to this sort of propaganda and rhetoric. There are many in 
Korea, especially among the younger generations and the media, who want the U.S. out. 
162 Since the Armistice, the political and economic interests of the two nations have diverged considerably. 
Cecilia Y. Oh, supra note 39, at 315; see also Charles K. Armstrong, The Politics of Transition in North 
and South Korea, in KOREA BRIEFING: TOWARD REUNIFICATION 5 (David R. McCann, ed., 1997) 
(“Beyond the state of transition. . . North and South Korea can hardly be more different.”).
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Indeed, that plays into the hands of North Korea propaganda, which says South Korea is 
not free, must be liberated by North Korea, because South Korea is under the imperialist 
fist of the US.  This way of thinking and feeling plays right into the hands of North 
Korea, and if it was not for the deterrent of American military might, South Korea might 
already be overrun by North Korea, and there would be a unified Korea, but it would be 
under Kim Jong Il and the totalitarian dictatorship thereof.
The North Korean regime puts the entire society in a straitjacket. It has at least ten 
known concentration camps, where political dissidents are tortured and executed, and a 
regime that has had many people literally starve to death or suffer greatly from 
malnutrition and starvation. There is no ability to socialize freely, no freedom of 
association, no freedom of press, no freedom of expression, no freedom of speech, no 
freedom of religion. The rights, freedoms and privileges that Americans and even South 
Koreas can at times take for granted are non-existent in North Korea.  Since there is no 
freedom of movement either, a North Korean citizen cannot travel freely out of the
country. It is an iron cage of a society with the canary inside wasting away--and certainly 
not singing.
Responses, or a Lack Thereof
Deep, historic ties exist between South Korea and the U.S., given that South 
Korea and the US have been close allies over the past half-century. In fact, the 
development of the two Koreas is intimately linked to the influence of other nations. Just 
as North Korea is an exaggerated version of Maoist China and Stalinist Soviet Union, 
through U.S. protection and investment, South Korea has developed into a much more 
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free-enterprise, democratic, and open society than its Northern counterpart.163 So there 
are extensive social, economic, political, religious, educational, and cultural ties.
These ties ought not be taken for granted or subsumed under the anti-U.S. rhetoric 
barrage tilting the culture. A solution would be for those in power in South Korea, and 
those in the media sympathetic to U.S.-South Korean ties, to promote the affinities 
between the two nations. South Korea must learn that all it has received back from North 
Korea for its extensive aid and economic investments has been continued hostility and an 
unrelenting aggressive stance against it. South Koreans need to know that they may be 
helping to sustain a failed regime, stoking the dying embers of that society, whereas if 
South Korea were not subsidizing North Korea to the extent that has, perhaps it would 
have collapsed already. South Korea may be unwittingly delaying the peaceful 
unification of the Korean peninsula by virtue of their propping up of a malignant, 
totalitarian dictatorship.
Legal and Diplomatic Solutions to North Korea
Although the above sections point to facets of an overall approach to dealing with 
North Korea, this essay climaxes with international legal and international relations 
applications, which would do well to consider the above context. 
Multi-Party, Not Bilateral, Negotiations
The Problem with Bilateral
China and Russia, among others, have urged appeasement of North Korea’s 
repeated demands for a bi-lateral security agreement with the United States.164 That 
163 Henderson, supra note 161.
164 Tatiana Zakaurtseva, North Korean Nuclear Issue and Some Ways of Its Settlement from the Russian 
Point of View: Peaceful Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issue, International Symposium on Peace 
and Prosperity in Northeast Asia (Jan. 13, 2005); Yunling Zhang, Ending Confrontation in the Korean 
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would be inadvisable. Hwang Jang Yop, the highest level defector from North Korea, 
indicated that North Korea still is intent on taking over South Korea and the whole 
peninsula (unification by force is the official North Korean policy still), and in order to 
do so, it seeks to take the U.S. out of the picture.165 The U.S. commitment to defend 
South Korea is the principal impediment for North Korea not to take over the 
peninsula166—after all, it was the U.S. forces, along with the UN and South Korean 
forces, which pushed back North Korean aggression during the Korean War. Thus, it 
would be a mistake to take Pyongyang’s insistence upon the security agreement with the 
U.S. as simply the paranoid delusions of a regime that anticipates U.S. aggression to 
dismantle the regime. Rather, if Hwang Jang Yop’s diagnosis is correct, and he has the 
best and highest inside view of the regime available, it is a very calculated effort for the 
North Koreans to take the U.S. out of the picture as far as defending South Korea on the 
peninsula.167
A recent U.S. bipartisan congressional delegation claimed some success in 
speaking with the North Korean government.168  Apparently, in an attempt to defuse the 
North Korean nuclear deterrent reasoning for its nuclear weapons program, the U.S. 
delegation indicated that Washington did not seek regime change nor plan a pre-emptive 
attack.169  During this visit, the beleaguered North reportedly offered to become a 
"friend" of the United States if Washington did not make inflammatory remarks about 
Peninsula: The Way Out , International Symposium on Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia (Jan. 13, 
2005).
165 Hwang Jang Yop, supra note 77.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 USATODAY (Jan. 15, 2005), at http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-01-15-koreas-
nuclearus_x.htm?csp=24&RM_Exclude=Juno.
169 Id.
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Kim Jong Il's regime.170  The North Korean government also stated its desire to resume  
"substantive discussions" according to Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) with no option "off the 
table," including an end result of "giving up their nuclear capability."171
Based on its repeated history of mendaciousness, obsessive efforts to keep a grip 
on its power, past reaping of benefits without corresponding adherence to the obligations 
that it agrees to, and continued goal to remove the U.S. from the picture on the peninsula, 
one should view this recent claim with the benefit of past experience and a knowledge of 
North Korea’s ambitions.  Even the day after this meeting, the official, government-
controlled newspaper (Nodohng Shinmuhn) continued its usual anti- American tirades, 
calling the U.S. a "nuclear criminal."172  The North Korean newspaper, given the history 
of what has transpired thus far, appears more representative of Pyongyang's actual stance.  
While speaking against the "inflammatory" language of the U.S., it frequently resorts to 
inflammatory anti-American language itself.
Multi-Lateral the Preferred Course 
Although there have been multilateral talks in Beijing, they have largely consisted 
of recitations of each country's positions, with no real progress towards an agreement.  
The United States, North and South Korea, China, Japan and Russia have attempted for 
months to set up another (fourth) meeting to pressure Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear 
weapons, a development that all the other countries sans North Korea claim to seek.  The 
Six-Party Talks have thus far failed to make much substantive progress in resolving the 
current crisis on the peninsula.  For the most part, the delegates from each country have 
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the setting up of sub-committees that would address issues:  however, no breakthroughs 
have yet emerged. North Korea indefinitely suspended the Six Party talks this year (2005) 
while giving conditions for it to return to these multilateral talks.
The efforts to encourage North Korea to continue in the multi-lateral talks, 
however, is still a favorable one because it takes North Korea’s regional neighbors and 
applies international pressure upon North Korea to disarm. However, Russia and China 
have thus far taken a less than tenacious stance towards North Korea and its nuclear 
weapons.  Yet the U.S. has let each country know that applying such pressure to North 
Korea would be desirable.173
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, indefinite suspension by North Korea, and the 
absence of a breakthrough, this approach is better than the US appearing to engage in 
unilateral efforts. Accordingly, the present administration is doing a fine job of resisting 
the brinkmanship blackmail that North Korea again attempts to perpetrate. Allowing 
North Korea to go straight to the US, over the head of South Korea, seriously undermines 
South Korea.  If there is any bilateral action, it should first and foremost be between 
South Korea and North Korea, who after all live on the same peninsula in question, not 
North Korea and the US. 
China's role could prove critical in resolving the crisis.  As North Korea's best ally 
in the world, China's strong insistence that North Korea denuclearize the peninsula would 
carry the most weight.  Whether China would do so remains in considerable doubt.
Russia, which has recently renewed its ties with North Korea, while not as 
influential as China, might have some sway with North Korea.  North Korea still owes a 
173 Zakaurtseva, supra note 164.
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sizable monetary debt to Russia.174  Russia could offer a measure of debt forgiveness as 
an incentive for North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons and program.
Japan has aligned itself with South Korea and the United States.  It takes a firm 
stance that North Korea must get rid of its nuclear arms.175  Given the outrageous actions 
by North Korea in abducting Japanese citizens and the sending of fraudulent bones of one 
of them when the issue arose, some 70 percent of the Japanese public support the levying 
of sanctions against North Korea.176
A Role for the UN Secretary General
These multi- party talks might benefit from outside assistance.  The UN Secretary 
General, currently Kofi Anan, could use his office as a mediator for multi-party talks.177
Passive attempts to make the Secretary General office available, as well as attempts to 
diminish tensions by going and visiting the respective countries, South and North Korea, 
have not helped in the past.178 Yet, when the U.S. failed in its attempts to gain the liberty 
of captured airmen, the Secretary General used his office to negotiate the release of 
captured U.S. airmen after the Korean War.179  A role as mediator for an existing multi-
party framework though, may help drive the talks.
North Korea has stated, however, that it does not consider the U.N. a neutral 
party.180  Their argument stems from the UN's condemnation, and subsequent military 
action against, the North Korean aggression that started the Korean War.  It all too 
conveniently does not credit the aid that UN organizations have rendered to North Korea. 
174 Id.
175 Akio Miyajima, Some Thoughts and Comments on [the] North Korean Nuclear Issue, International 
Symposium on Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia (Jan. 13, 2005).
176 Id. at 168.
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Implementing This Strategy
Hwang Jang Yop also indicated that Kim Jong Il is a coward, and capriciously 
changes his decisions based on his mood.181 If that is so, it is possible that a course of 
diplomacy that is incrementally increased to the point of actively going in and disarming 
North Korea at the last stage of this process might be the best thing--to call North Korea’s 
bluff and see whether or not Kim Jong Il proves to be as courageous as Sadam Hussain 
was--darting from spider hole to spider hole and offering very little resistance to US 
forces notwithstanding his inflated rhetoric. 
However, this would not be the first or even most desirable step in the process—it 
should come only if prior efforts fail.  A call for continued multi-lateral pressure from 
other countries and international organizations, with resort as much as possible to 
international law, should continue—whether or not North Korea returns to the six-party 
talks.  Additionally, invitations to North Korea to engage in negotiations either through
the good offices of the UN secretary general and/or to the multi-lateral six-party talks can 
be extended to Pyongyang again.  
Step by step, the heat can be raised on North Korea, and as the heat is being 
raised, the drive for accountable ways (also known as CVID:182 Complete, Verifiable and 
Irreversible Dismantlement) in which North Korea could indeed be disarmed can be 
pursued. After the heat increases sufficiently, giving some positive incentives for North 
Korea to comply could increase the likelihood of a peaceful resolution.183  Both sticks 
181 Hwang Jang Yop, supra note 77.
182 International Symposium on Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia (Jan. 13, 2005). 
183 This principle emerges from the best analytical study on the topice, COERCIVE DIPLOMACY, supra note 
___
North Korea Nuclear Crisis 42
and carrots (but sticks first184) of these can be incrementally ratcheted up, step by step, 
stage by stage, to the point where if none of these things work, only then would it be time 
for a very proactive international effort to disarm North Korea.  Such an approach seems 
to be the best way to approach the North Korean crisis because softer approaches have 
clearly failed repeatedly in the past. 
Giving positive incentives and a soft landing or a soft way out after turning up the 
heat and pressure might be much more persuasive to a regime that operates on the basis 
of fear and intimidation of its own people, as well as its regional neighbors, and indeed, 
the world.185 Along the lines of this incremental ratcheting up, it could include possibly 
an agreement with specific resort to the UN Security Council and the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ) upon noncompliance, and whatever is maximally possible through the 
IAEA186 built in.
Along these lines, it could then help to have UN Security Council resolutions187 or 
other assertive action.188 The basis for such resolutions and possible sanctions can lie 
squarely on the multiple instruments of international law that North Korea has violated.  
Consider, for example, that it has broken every single major agreement that they have 
made, whether with another country(ies) or international organizations: the biological 
weapons convention, the cease-fire agreement after their initial Korean War, the 1991-92 
184 Drennan, supra note 10, culls several lessons from the history of U.S. coercive diplomacy.  It seems like 
in this incremental ratcheting up, that the stakes can be made more and more serious for North Korea, and 
as that pressure is being applied, perhaps a way out, including positive incentives for verifiable 
disarmament could look increasingly attractive. 
185 But see Id. at 193-95 (the Clinton administration’s reliance on incentives encouraged Kim Il Sung’s 
brinkmanship tactics almost to the point that he finally crossed the only real limit the U.S. had – the 
development of nuclear weapons).
186 A weakness of the IAEA is that it does not provide for resort to the ICJ.
187 Zakaurtseva, supra note 164, recommends an in camera meeting of the Security Council.
188 A reason to think that UN Security Council action could help is that during the early 1990’s, when North 
Korea initially spoke of withdrawal from the NPT, an IAEA appeal to the UN Security Council brought 
North Korea back in at that time.
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agreements with South Korea, the 2000 agreement after the summit between the leaders 
of South Korea and North, the 1994 Agreed Framework, the IAEA dictates, the non-
proliferation treaty that it belonged to since 2003, etc. 189  Hwang Jang Yop indicates how 
North Korea only enters into such agreements for tactical gain—not with any intention to 
restrict itself based on legal instruments.190
There is an interesting secondary role that the General Assembly can play if the 
UN Security Council is paralyzed by the abuse of a veto by, for example, China, who 
would be the most likely one to veto actions--including resolutions or sanctions against 
North Korea.191  It can take the initiative to recommend action by the UN Security 
Council in such situations while passing resolutions of its own.192
There should be international, not just U.S. verification of North Korea's 
disarmament, and that what they did in terms of kicking out the IAEA inspectors193 in the 
past would firmly be deemed to be unacceptable.  Otherwise, the acceptability and 
impunity of nuclear proliferation would be a message learned by other potentially 
dangerous regimes.  Ideally, it would be best if North Korea returns to the NPT Treaty—
given that it was the first country in history to withdraw from it and disavow it in 2003.194
Regardless of North Korean withdrawal from the NPT, there remains little doubt that 
they breached it while still a party to it.195
Again, it is worth stressing that there ought to be as many defensive measures put 
in place by the South Korean and US military to deter North Korean aggression as much 
189 See, e.g., Koh, supra note 153, 1492-93; Cecilia Y. Oh, supra note 39, at 314-15.
190 Hwang Jang Yop, supra note 77.
191 Pak, supra note 177. This role for the General Assembly emerged out of the Uniting for Peace resolution 
precedent.
192 Id.
193 Gills, supra note 7.
194 Id.
195 Id.
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as possible. The US must reaffirm a strong determination to defend South Korea.  What 
North Korea would perceive as U.S. weakness or anticipated non-involvement could 
prove catastrophic for the peninsula. 
In this whole process of external pressure, North Korea could come closer and 
closer to an internal collapse,196 in which case the possibility for reunification exists. On 
the other hand, the threat of China perhaps stepping in and grabbing North Korea would 
then be distinct possibilities. China, however, denies a desire in this direction. 197
There are various factors that have been correlated to increase the likelihood of 
success for the course of coercive diplomacy, and each of these can be applied to the 
North Korean context.198 Although each context is not identical to other contexts, certain 
analogies may be drawn. 
Conclusion
A situation as complex199 as the current North Korean crisis requires an 
understanding of history200 and context, a consideration of options and ideas from various 
angles (including legal), and courageous yet not foolhardy implementation.  The stakes 
could rise as high as not only another Korean War, but at its worst, even World War III,
if countries such as China, Russia, Japan and the United States all enter the fray.  
On the other hand, a successful resolution can build a bridge towards peaceful 
reunification, which could help considerably in stabilizing the region, stimulate growth 
and cooperation there, and avert a horrendous cataclysm.  If the thoughts in this article 
196 Sung Chull Kim et al., supra note 145.
197 Yunling Zhang, supra note 164.
198 See Drennan, supra note 10, at 157-99.
199 The conflict between the two Koreas has its own encyclopedia. Hoare & Pares, supra note 85.
200 For more about how the two Koreas developed during their first thirty years as separate nations, see
Joungwon Alexander Kim, DIVIDED KOREA: THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT, 1945-1972 (1975). For a 
more far-ranging historical perspective, see Gills, supra note 7.
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help move the situation towards greater understanding and resolution through
implementation in even a small way, it would have fulfilled its primary raison d'etre.  If 
it at least gives more clarity to the issues involved so that all concerned may see more 
sharply, then it was not written in vain.  While at best a work in progress as the actual 
situation continues to unfold, it aims to provide constructive insight into a very 
precarious, real life situation that cries out to be understood and addressed--rather than 
ignored.   
